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Foreword

Introduction to Decentralization and
Development
Shitong Qiao† & Richard A. Epstein††
On March 14–15, 2017, a group of Asian and American
scholars working in the areas of law, economics, and political science gathered at the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law.
They debated and discussed decentralization and development
at a conference cosponsored by New York University’s Classical
Liberal Institute and the University of Hong Kong Faculty of
Law’s Centre for Chinese Law. What does decentralization
mean? How do we best measure decentralization? Is interjurisdictional competition a race to the bottom or a race to the top? Is
decentralization desirable in China or other jurisdictions?
This symposium contains papers presented at the conference, in which authors take various approaches to the relationship between decentralization and development: one group of
scholars takes a universal and theoretical approach; while the
second group of scholars offers original case studies from China,
exploring decentralization and its implications on development.
It is worthwhile to stress at the beginning that these Chinese
case studies challenge and enrich the general theories on decentralization and development—just as Barry Weingast and
Yingyi Qian coined the phrase “market-preserving federalism”
over two decades ago to capture the institutional practices in
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China.1 In so doing, they triggered a long-lasting debate on federalism and development.2 We thank the editors of Minnesota
Law Review for their tremendous partnership and professional
work in rounding out these symposium pieces for publication.
Friedrich A. Hayek—the leading classical liberal thinker of
the twentieth century, whose legacy is still shaping theory and
practices around the world—is the main inspiration of this symposium. According to Hayek,
If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of
rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time
and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be
left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know
directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be solved
by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which,
after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by
some form of decentralization.3

The first question we should ask is what decentralization
means. Decentralization can happen in many different contexts.
It can happen between the state and individuals, such as decentralizing land-use decisions to individual property owners;4 between the state and market entities, a prime example of which
is the delegation of legal institution building by the Chinese cen-

1. See Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1,
1 (1995); Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism as a Commitment to
Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 83 (1997) (offering a secondgeneration economic theory of federalism).
2. See, e.g., Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50, 56 (1995);
Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076, 1105 (2011). For a critique of market-preserving federalism, see generally Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Did Government Decentralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle?, 58 WORLD POL. 505
(2006); Lizhi Liu & Barry R. Weingast, Taobao, Federalism, and the Emergence
of Law, Chinese Style, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1563, 1569–73 (2018); Xiaobo Lü &
Pierre F. Landry, Show Me the Money: Interjurisdiction Political Competition
and Fiscal Extraction in China, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 706 (2014); Jonathan
Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1521 (1997); Xiangyu Shi & Tianyang Xi, Race to Safety: Political Competition, Neighborhood Effects, and Coal Mine Deaths in China, 131 J. DEV. ECON.
79 (2018).
3. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 524 (1945) (emphasis added).
4. See Richard A. Epstein, Positive and Negative Externalities in Real Estate Development, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1493 (2018).
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tral government to Taobao, the biggest online commercial platform in the world;5 and between different levels of government.6
Richard Epstein addresses the relationship between decentralization and development in the context of land-use law and
offers a conceptual explanation of how to make sound land-use
development decisions in the face of the pervasive positive and
negative externalities from a comparative perspective, with special emphasis on English and American law.7 How should common interests in high-population-density regions be coordinated? One approach is top down, where centralized state
authorities make the allocative decisions. The alternative approach is decentralized decision-making. Epstein argues that
the state should simply set and enforce boundaries between
strangers, and let multiple parties decide privately whether to
pool or to separate their activities.8 Starting with the singleowner paradigm, in which no externalities are possible, and
moving to discussions on zoning and affordable housing mandates, Epstein explains why a system of decentralized property
rights and private regulations controls most of the negative externalities while capturing most of the positive externalities.9
Lizhi Liu and Barry Weingast move forward from “federalism, Chinese style” to “law, Chinese style,” by which they mean
private actors devising new institutional rules in China.10 In a
country with neither Western-style democracy nor an independent judiciary, they explore the best way of achieving credible
commitments in market transactions—and the role being played
by a private technology firm. Taobao is China’s dominant online
trading platform, with over four hundred million users. It “is not
simply an exchange platform, but one in the process of develop-

5. See Liu & Weingast, supra note 2.
6. See Yun-chien Chang & Ke Xu, Decentralized and Anomalous Interpretation of Chinese Private Law: Understanding a Bureaucratic and Political Judicial System, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1527 (2018); Kevin E. Davis, Data and Decentralization: Measuring the Performance of Legal Institutions in Multilevel
Systems of Governance, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1621 (2018); Roderick M. Hills, Jr. &
Shitong Qiao, Binding Leviathan: Credible Commitment in an Authoritarian
Regime, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1593 (2018); Shitong Qiao, Rights-Weakening Federalism, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1673 (2018); Ilya Somin, Foot Voting, Decentralization, and Development, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1651 (2018).
7. Epstein, supra note 4.
8. Id. at 1494.
9. Id. at 1524–25.
10. Liu & Weingast, supra note 2, at 1574–76.
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ing a modern legal system that enforces contracts, resolves disputes, and prevents fraud.”11 Liu and Weingast argue that “development of law, Chinese style, parallels previous instances
where the central government delegated reform authority during the reform period from the early 1980s through the early
1990s.”12 Moreover, the emergence of Taobao’s national market
overcomes internal trade barriers, an inherent problem with
market-preserving federalism that has been raised by scholars.13
Other scholars examine decentralization in the context of allocation of authority between different levels of government.
Kevin Davis points to the difficulty in measuring the performance of legal institutions in multilevel systems of governance,
which, in turn, likely affects the accountability and responsiveness of the institutions being measured.14 Davis focuses especially on the challenges to producing indicators that isolate the
performance of individual legal institutions, particularly subnational institutions.15 These challenges come from main sources:
one is that governance outcomes are determined jointly by multilevel institutions instead of institutions operating at a single
level; the other is the lack of interest by suppliers of such measurement indicators.16 Davis argues that while “there are several
examples of legal performance measures that cover subnational
territories,” those indicators are “not . . . good measures of the
performance of any particular subnational legal institution.”17 In
a broader sense, Davis points to the complication of decentralization and the potential tragedy of the regulatory commons in
multilevel governance.
One natural appeal of a decentralized system is that individuals are able to vote by foot. Albert O. Hirschman’s classical
book Exit, Voice and Loyalty raises the ever-intriguing trade-off
between exit and voice.18 Following his previous work criticizing
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 1565.
Id.
See, e.g., Rodden & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2.
See generally GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH
CLASSIFICATION AND RANKINGS (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012); THE QUIET
POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, AND RULE OF
LAW (Sally Engle Merry, Kevin E. Davis, & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2015).
15. Davis, supra note 6, at 1623.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1633.
18. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1972).
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ballot voting,19 Ilya Somin argues that “the best way to create
new development is to facilitate foot voting by decentralizing political power and breaking down obstacles to mobility.”20 He argues that foot voting promotes development both in a federal system and across international boundaries.21 More specifically,
Somin argues that migration can enable effective exploitation of
“place premiums”—situations where a given individual is likely
to be more productive in one location than another, and explores
mechanisms that would facilitate foot voting both domestically
and internationally.22
In contrast, Roderick Hills and Shitong Qiao continue their
exploration of the interaction between national and subnational
governments and the political institutions behind interjurisdictional competition.23 Their symposium paper studies why Chinese local officials, who are subject to frequent transfer by the
central government, are unable to make a credible commitment
to any development projects they try to initiate during their
terms.24 Hills and Qiao describe how the problem of credible
commitment posed by China’s cadre transfer policy, and, more
generally, the Chinese Communist Party’s distrust of divided
power, have led to excessive municipal debt in China. They propose three new institutional solutions for resolving the credible
commitment problem of China’s authoritarian regime, including
using decentralized homevoters instead of centralized institutions as local government monitors.25
Other participants question whether decentralization is
necessarily desirable in the first instance. Yun-chien Chang and
Ke Xu offer one of the very first large-scale empirical studies of
Chinese judicial decisions to test how local courts apply national
laws in adjudicating property disputes.26 Their Article points to
a central question in law and development: whether and how the
past decades of codification of private law in China—including
19. See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY
SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 80 (2d ed. 2016).
20. Somin, supra note 6, at 1651.
21. Id. at 1652.
22. Id. at 1653–57.
23. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Shitong Qiao, Voice and Exit as Accountability
Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist Party?,
48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158 (2016).
24. Hills & Qiao, supra note 6.
25. Id. at 1614–19.
26. Chang & Xu, supra note 6.
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contract law, property law, tort law, and the ongoing legislation
of the civil code—will shape the Chinese economy and society atlarge. They argue that the answer largely depends on how nationally promulgated statutes are interpreted by local Chinese
courts.27 Their empirical investigation reveals that decentralized
interpretations follow geographic boundaries, given the power of
non-legal-institutional constraints that operate within the jurisdictional boundaries of the thirty-one provincial high courts.
These anomalous interpretations present no clear patterns and
create unpredictability that economic actors, especially those
who seek to operate on a national stage, cannot plan around.
Chang and Xu argue that decentralized judicial interpretations
therefore are highly likely to harm economic development in
China.28
Finally, Shitong Qiao examines the gap between national
land laws and local land reforms in China and investigates
whether interjurisdictional competition protects land rights in
China.29 His empirical investigation reveals that local governments take far more land than the national government has authorized.30 These local governments alternatively violate, tweak,
or challenge the national law. His examination of the impact of
interjurisdictional competition on the development of local land
institutions demonstrates that local governments are weakening
individual land rights in order to attract mobile capital. Qiao
therefore calls decentralized land reforms in China rights-weakening federalism.31 Qiao further argues that the structure and
power of local governance—the balance between land and capital—matters much more than competition per se, so that the
proper question to ask with respect to interjurisdictional competition is: Who shapes and benefits from the competition?
Many of the symposium papers use Chinese institutions as
case studies, killing two birds with one stone. One key to China’s
economic development miracle over the past four decades has arguably been decentralization,32 which makes it the perfect jurisdiction for studying decentralization and development. As the
largest developing country in the world, China is still experiencing ongoing institutional experiments throughout the country.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1560–62.
Id.
Qiao, supra note 6.
Id. at 1685.
Id. at 1675.
See Xu, supra note 2, at 1081–82.
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These separate events provide rare opportunities for us to observe how decentralization works in practice, and it provides a
stimulus that should trigger further theoretical work on the
overall process of innovation. Our discussions also reveal useful
lessons for China’s reform in different spheres of activity, including the Internet, land use, the judiciary, and local governance.
Readers of this symposium will have to make their own
judgments on whether we have made the debate on decentralization clearer or muddier. As this symposium demonstrates, decentralization can happen in different forms, in different contexts, and on different time frames, where the multiplicity of
outcomes are difficult to measure. The increasingly blurry
boundaries, competition, and interactions between different levels of government also make it hard to evaluate the impact of
decentralization on development. Individual or decentralized decisions often have wide-ranging impacts on the whole system.33
As Hayek wrote immediately following the paragraph cited at
the beginning of this Foreword:
[Decentralization] answers only part of our problem. We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of the
particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used. But
the “man on the spot” cannot decide solely on the basis of his limited
but intimate knowledge of the facts of his immediate surroundings.
There still remains the problem of communicating to him such further
information as he needs to fit his decisions into the whole pattern of
changes of the larger economic system.34

Hayek argues that the price system meets this challenge.35
He is undoubtedly right that the price system solves many problems, but surely it does not solve all these problems given that
competitive solutions are not easy to come by for, say, network
industries or pollution control. But at least some of these problems are amenable to decentralized solutions, which will have to
rely heavily on various markets and their accompanying price
mechanisms to guide and coordinate both private and government actors. We hope this symposium will invite scholars to rethink decentralization and development in today’s ever changing
political and technological environment. We also hope that this
collection of papers proves useful to policymakers and other

33. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An
Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889 (2013) (organizing a modern accounting of federalism into five observations).
34. Hayek, supra note 3, 524–25.
35. Id. at 525.
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practitioners making decisions about the allocation of resources
and powers in achieving development goals.

